The Transformation of Venezuela by Trinkunas, Harold A.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2010
The Transformation of Venezuela
Trinkunas, Harold A.
Latin American Research Review, Vol. 45, No. 3., 2010
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/43094
Latin American Research Review, Vol. 45, No. 3. © 2010 by the Latin American Studies Association.
T H E  T R A N S F O R M AT I O N  O F  V E N E Z U E L A
Harold A. Trinkunas
Naval Postgraduate School
Rethinking Venezuelan Politics: Class, Confl ict, and the Chávez Phe-
nomenon. By Steve Ellner. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2008. 
Pp. xiv + 257. $55.00 cloth.
Dictatorship and Politics: Intrigue: Betrayal, and Survival in Venezu-
ela, 1908–1935. By Brian Stuart McBeth. Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2008. Pp. xiv + 578. $60.00 cloth.
The Enduring Legacy: Oil, Culture, and Society in Venezuela. By Miguel 
Tinker Salas. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009. Pp. xvi + 234. 
$23.95 paper. $84.95 cloth.
For all the talk of revolution in Venezuela today, it is the twentieth cen-
tury that witnessed the most profound transformation in the country’s 
state and society. Prior to the advent to power of Juan Vicente Gómez in 
1908, Venezuela mirrored many of its neighbors in the Latin Caribbean: it 
had an agricultural economy with few substantial exports, a profoundly 
divided society in which regional and local attachments (la patria chica) had 
pride of place, and a political arena in which violence frequently settled 
disputes. By the time Hugo Chávez came to power in 1999, Venezuela had 
transformed into a modern country with all its strengths and weaknesses: a 
rentier state, a democratic polity, and a modern and cosmopolitan society.
Particularly during the past decade, scholarship on Venezuelan poli-
tics has fl ourished. The phenomena of Chavismo and President Chávez 
in power have spawned numerous academic studies and a veritable in-
dustry of books aimed at a general audience.1 The polarization evident in 
Venezuelan politics today has, on occasion, spilled over into scholarship. 
The rentier economy, the hypercentralized but highly ineffi cient state, the 
1. Although Richard Gott’s In the Shadow of the Liberator (London: Verso, 2000) marked the 
beginning of this genre, books for a general audience on Hugo Chávez have continued to 
appear at a rather steady clip throughout the past decade.
The contents of this article are solely the responsibility of the author, and they do not rep-
resent the views of the Naval Postgraduate School or the U.S. Navy. I would like to thank 
Elisabeth Friedman and Francisco Monaldi for commenting on earlier drafts of this review. 
Any remaining errors are entirely attributable to the author.
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 primacy of populist politics, and the success or decline of democracy have 
all been examined at length, generating acrimonious and contentious 
 debate as to whether things are getting better or worse. However, not all 
that many scholars have reached back to connect Venezuela’s evolution 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to present-day politics un-
der Chávez. In other words, where does the Venezuela we see today come 
from? What does this tell us about where it might go?
The three well-researched books by Brian McBeth, Miguel Tinker Sa-
las, and Steve Ellner allow for an understanding of the deep roots of the 
transformations that produced the state and society today in Venezuela. 
McBeth helps us understand how Gómez retained power long enough to 
create a modern state between 1908 and 1935, a state able to pacify politics, 
maintain sovereignty, and set in motion oil-led development that eventu-
ally produced a rentier state. Tinker Salas looks closely at how oil produc-
tion transformed society, thus infl uencing the creation of a modern mid-
dle class in Venezuela. Ellner connects the dots between the emergence 
of modern politics following the death of Gómez in 1935, a politics based 
on class interests (which multiclass parties later tamed between 1958 and 
1998), the crisis of the party system that brought Chávez to power in 1999, 
and today’s debates about the future direction of Chavismo.
STATE FORMATION IN VENEZUELA
The period during which Juan Vicente Gómez governed (1908–1935) is 
frequently treated as an undifferentiated black box of barbarity in most 
popular accounts of Venezuelan history. Yet, as McBeth documents, it was 
actually crucial to the formation of the Venezuelan state. Gómez, a coffee 
farmer from the Andes, came to Caracas as part of the Revolución Lib-
eral Restauradora, led by Cipriano Castro in 1899. After Castro’s tumultu-
ous period of rule, Gómez quietly arranged to depose him and assumed 
power for the next twenty-seven years. He governed with the help of a se-
cret police of unparalleled brutality, and in many ways, he ran Venezuela 
as a personal plantation, accumulating one of the largest fortunes in South 
America at the time of his death. His motto was “Unión, Paz, y Trabajo,” 
which was apocryphally interpreted as “unión en las cárceles, trabajo en 
las carreteras, y paz en el cementerio,” given the number of political pris-
oners incarcerated and forced to work on the national highway system, 
frequently under conditions leading to their early death.
The black legend of Gómez’s dictatorship has come under fi re by his-
torians for some time, and a number of fi ne revisionist studies have been 
published, of which McBeth’s is the latest.2 It is not hard to understand 
2. A number of histories written in Venezuela reexamine Gómez’s rule with an eye to 
developing a more accurate account. Although not an exhaustive list, these include the 
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why such a legend came about, given the ruthlessness of the regime. As 
Ellner notes in his very thorough review, it was politically useful for the 
democratizers that followed to construct this black legend so as to then dif-
ferentiate themselves. By casting aspersions on Gómez, the democratizers 
justifi ed some of their own excesses while highlighting their successes. 
McBeth digs deep into the sources of the political turmoil that charac-
terized Gómez’s rule, using extensive archival sources and interviews to 
build an astonishingly detailed picture of the period.
McBeth brings into sharp relief the fragility of Venezuela as a nation 
when Gómez assumed power. Several major European powers had block-
aded the country, and it was highly indebted to foreigners, fragmented 
by regional and political rivalries, and prone to civil war and economic 
crises. The government lived from hand to mouth, wholly dependent on 
customs revenues and frequently in default on its debts under Castro. Af-
ter becoming president, Gómez was constantly under assault by rebel-
lions and coup plots, to such an extent that it would be all too easy for a 
nonspecialist to lose track of these problems because of the sheer number 
of conspiratorial movements that McBeth has documented. In addition, 
foreign powers often considered removing General Gómez from power 
during his fi rst decade in offi ce.
By the time of his death in 1935, Gómez had changed all this. Venezuela 
had no foreign debt, had successfully negotiated and developed one of 
the largest oil industries in the Western Hemisphere, and had expanded 
agricultural and educational opportunities. In addition, Gómez had de-
militarized the population by defeating regional caudillos, had formed a 
modern national army, and had established the kernel of a modern state 
bureaucracy. Although not always emphasized, the campaign of depoliti-
cization by repression also wiped out the traditional Liberal and Conser-
vative parties, opening the way for a new system infl uenced by European 
ideologies such as socialism and Christian democracy.3
The foundation Gómez established had its fl aws. A nearly inescap-
able consequence of oil dominance was the rentier state.4 This, in turn, 
following: Germán Carrera Damas, Jornadas de historia crítica: La evasora personalidad de Juan 
Vicente Gómez y otros temas (Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela, Ediciones de la 
Biblioteca, 1983); Yolanda Segnini, La consolidación del régimen de Juan Vicente Gómez (Cara-
cas: Academia Nacional de Historia, 1982); Tomás Polanco Alcantara, Juan Vicente Gómez: 
Aproximación a una biografía (Caracas: Academia Nacional de Historia, 1990); Francisco Car-
reño Delgado, El benemérito: Un bellaco admirable (Caracas: Editorial Texto, 1987); Manuel 
Caballero, Gómez, El tirano liberal (Caracas: Monte Ávila, 1994).
3. For a fi ne overview of state formation in Venezuela, see Doug Yarrington, “Cattle, 
Corruption and Venezuelan State Formation during the Regime of Juan Vicente Gómez, 
1908–1935,” Latin American Research Review 38, no. 2 (2003): 9–33.
4. See Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petrostates (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1997).
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 supported the hypercentralization of the state in Caracas, the primacy of 
the presidency over other branches of government, and thoroughgoing 
corruption in the exercise of state power. A cynic might observe that Ven-
ezuela’s fundamental problem since that time has been how to coordinate 
the transfer of state oil revenues into private hands while avoiding politi-
cal violence. Ellner provides considerable insight into the various political 
mechanisms used to unravel this Gordian knot.
TRANSFORMATION OF VENEZUELAN SOCIETY
Although Venezuela prided itself on being semioffi cially color blind 
during much of the twentieth century, it had inherited diffi cult racial and 
ethnic divisions from the time of its independence, including a history 
of mistreating indigenous peoples and the enslavement of Venezuelans 
of African descent. To this, we can add the class distinctions that sprang 
up and became accentuated when oil catapulted Venezuelan society (or at 
least some parts of it) into modernity. The major political parties of the so-
called Fourth Republic (1958–1998)—Acción Democrática (AD) and  Comité 
de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (COPEI)—hewed to the 
semioffi cial mythology of a racially integrated society and advocated 
multiclass parties precisely because they had discovered during the 
Trienio (the three-year period of AD rule between 1945 and 1948) just how 
volatile and dangerous it could be to mobilize race and class tensions in 
Venezuela.
President Chávez departed from this political consensus quite dra-
matically after 1999. With explicit appeals to poor and working-class Ven-
ezuelans, his political campaigns revisited what the traditional elites had 
considered dangerous ground. He also highlighted, along class lines, the 
African and indigenous roots of Venezuelan culture to an extent unpar-
alleled by politicians of the previous democratic period. This approach 
has prompted a good deal of new debate on the issue of race and class in 
Venezuela.5
Tinker Salas explores the deep roots of race, class, and gender dynamics 
in modern Venezuela through the lens of the oil industry. His upbringing 
in and near the oil camps that dominated the exploitation and production 
of crude in Venezuela shapes his interest.6 He argues that, by bringing 
new technology, personnel, and modes of organization to bear, inter-
national oil companies transformed the landscapes of the cities, towns, 
and immediate environs of the oil fi elds through informal, unplanned 
construction and rapid oil-focused infrastructure development. The im-
5. See Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petrostates (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1997).
6. Ibid.
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pact of oil completely overwhelmed cities and small towns, particularly 
in the state of Zulia, as newcomers placed unprecedented demands on 
largely traditional societies.
Tinker Salas argues that the approaches and techniques of foreign 
oil workers and managers produced an increasingly stratifi ed society in 
these areas, beginning in the 1920s. In particular, the attitudes of the many 
workers recruited from Texas and Oklahoma infl uenced society and gov-
ernance in the oil camps, affecting not only labor but also gender and race 
relations. As the camps developed, companies increasingly encouraged 
expatriates to move their families to the compounds to stabilize them. 
This added another dimension to the social and cultural tensions between 
Venezuelans and foreign workers. In addition, the desire for skilled and 
semiskilled English-speaking labor created a demand for immigrants 
from the British Caribbean. The inclusion of foreigners of South Asian 
and African descent added yet another layer of social tension to the camp 
hierarchy and Venezuelan society more generally.
This is not to say that Venezuelans opposed the jobs that grew out of 
the oil industry. They fl ocked in large numbers to the main production 
centers (initially mostly in Zulia and Falcón in western Venezuela), which 
completely transformed local societies and brought together Venezuelans 
from different regional backgrounds in a manner without precedent, prob-
ably since the wars of independence. Tinker Salas argues that Venezuelan 
workers resented the social and labor hierarchy that the camps produced, 
and this provided fertile grounds for a labor movement that later came 
to have signifi cant infl uence on national labor relations. The contrast be-
tween the highly regimented, organized, and groomed life in the camps 
(which resembled small suburban enclaves in the United States) and the 
relatively informal communities surrounding them is a consistent theme 
in the book, one that ultimately helped drive the evolution of Venezuelan 
attitudes toward foreign oil companies.
Tinker Salas suggests that the values that international oil companies 
(mainly from the United States) communicated to Venezuelans in the in-
dustry came to be embedded in the middle class and persisted in the or-
ganizational culture of the industry after nationalization. In particular, 
in reaction to the early nationalization of oil in Mexico in 1938, foreign oil 
companies pursued a policy of venezolanización that brought local work-
ers, managers, and professionals into higher and higher levels of respon-
sibility within the industry. Tinker Salas tells a fascinating story of the 
great lengths to which the oil industry went to foster middle-class values 
among its workers, encouraging home ownership, education, punctual-
ity, and hard work as a way to fend off nationalization or, worse (from 
the companies’ perspective), communism. Tinker Salas shows how Ven-
ezuelan professionals and workers absorbed the foreign values associated 
with the oil industry, even as they continued to experience a social gulf 
P5331.indb   243 10/2/10   11:21:12 AM
244 Latin American Research Review
between themselves and the largely American and British expatriates who 
still populated the upper levels of management in the 1950s and 1960s. He 
suggests that these values carried forward into the industry after nation-
alization, infl uencing the formation of a state within the state.
Foreign oil companies also carefully tracked local politics beyond the 
boundaries of their industry, sometimes intervening to fend off what they 
perceived as extreme movements but more frequently reaching arrange-
ments with whatever regime held power. This came to mean a persistent 
campaign to infl uence public opinion through the media and propaganda. 
Some efforts were quite inventive, but it is not clear from Tinker Salas’s 
study how much effect they actually had on the broader population. Nev-
ertheless, they persistently pushed the message that oil companies (and 
their objectives) were good for Venezuela. As Tinker Salas documents, 
many employees of the oil industry came to believe this as well.
These arguments start to fall fl at when Tinker Salas stretches his fi nd-
ings to claim that foreign oil companies also shaped the values of a broad 
range of Venezuelans, particularly in the middle class. This claim should 
be treated carefully because, even at its peak in 1948, the industry em-
ployed only 4.5 percent of the labor force. Other sources claim a somewhat 
lower 3.5 percent of the economically active population was involved in 
the industry, and both fi gures declined quite rapidly in the following 
decade.7 The rapid urbanization of Venezuela made possible by oil rents 
surely had a greater role in the formation of a middle class, yet any effects 
foreign oil companies might have had on this process were quite indirect. 
In addition, the contrasts in wealth and social status that oil camps pro-
duced were generally experienced only in the states of Zulia and Falcón 
(and later Monagas) during this period. The contrast between popular 
barrios and middle-class urbanizations in major cities (where the oil in-
dustry employed very few on either side of the divide) was much more 
likely to affect politics on a broad national scale than exposure to the ways 
of foreign oil companies.
In addition, although Tinker Salas makes a strong argument for the ef-
fect of foreign oil companies on their employees, the gamut of infl uences 
bearing at the same time on the broader middle class is remarkable. In 
addition to the values that newly urbanized Venezuelans brought from 
their home districts to cities, large-scale immigration, including hundreds 
of thousands of skilled workers, also contributed to the development of 
the middle class. The new residents from abroad included Republican 
refugees from the Spanish Civil War; other Europeans escaping war, re-
pression, and economic hardship during and after the Second World War; 
immigrants from the Levant attracted by economic opportunities and the 
7. See Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petrostates (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1997).
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absence of violent confl ict; those politically persecuted by Southern Cone 
dictatorships in the 1960s and 1970s who escaped to one of a few stable de-
mocracies in Latin America; and others from across the globe in search of 
a better standard of living.8 To suggest that foreign oil companies, largely 
from the United States, were predominant in shaping the values of the 
middle class may be one of the few cases in which one can overstate the 
oil industry’s impact on Venezuela.
THE TRANSFORMATION OF VENEZUELAN POLITICS
 Beginning with the 1928 student movement that Gómez thoroughly 
repressed, a new generation of politicians unaffi liated with the traditional 
Liberal and Conservative parties began to organize to take power. Gómez’s 
heirs, military offi cers originating in the Andean region, managed to hold 
on to power through 1958, albeit with a brief interlude of democratiza-
tion in 1945–1948. A central problem with which both the armed forces 
and democratizers had to struggle was how to administer increasing oil 
revenues, which fl owed to the state through relatively little effort of its 
own. The struggle to balance investment against distribution, particularly 
distribution through legal channels aimed to alleviate societal concerns, 
indeed marks Venezuelan politics.
Although he claims to bring socioeconomic factors back in, Ellner actu-
ally showcases his grasp of the role of political actors in the transforma-
tion of Venezuelan politics in the twentieth century. Building on his earlier 
work critiquing notions of Venezuelan exceptionalism, Ellner reminds us 
of the social and political struggles underpinning the evolution of a mod-
ern party system in Venezuela, its eventual crisis during the 1990s, and 
its collapse under Chávez. The fi rst four chapters of Rethinking Venezuelan 
Politics offer an especially useful and nuanced critique of traditional ap-
proaches to understanding twentieth-century Venezuelan politics.
Clearly, the socioeconomic factors that Ellner tries to bring back in are 
the class tensions that have arisen from the persistent exclusion from poli-
tics and society of substantial numbers of Venezuelans, particularly of the 
lowest classes. Although AD and COPEI (the dominant parties of the post-
Gómez period) both had populist wings genuinely concerned with so-
cial reform and justice, most twentieth-century Venezuelan governments 
were able to reduce poverty only during boom times associated with high 
oil prices. The sheer volume of money sloshing through the system inevi-
tably created an economic tide that fl oated all boats, though not for very 
long in many cases. After the boom times receded, the underlying class 
tension between the barrios and middle- and upper-class urbanizaciones 
8. See Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petrostates (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1997).
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was never very far away, as the 1989 urban revolt known as the Caracazo 
reminded Venezuela and its observers.
Ellner documents President Chávez’s evolution in power, from his fi rst 
electoral victory to his proclamation of twenty-fi rst century socialism. 
Chávez promised to address the socioeconomic divide and, unlike politi-
cians of the previous four decades, he defi nitely picked a side. This return 
to a more populist and partisan approach has worked to keep Chávez 
in power, allowing him to win most elections and survive a coup, a gen-
eral strike, and a recall referendum. After a decade in power, it is only 
fair to review the political and ideological underpinnings of the Chavista 
movement, especially because it advertises itself in explicitly ideological 
terms such as bolivarianismo and twenty-fi rst century socialism. Ellner has a 
fi ne ear for the dialogue of the broad array of groups, parties, movements, 
and cliques that make up Chavismo. He notes the tensions between ef-
forts to improve democratic participation by independents and grassroots 
supporters of Chavismo, and the compulsion to “follow the leader” and 
defend vertical lines of authority by the Chavista leadership. Some schol-
ars suggest that it may oversimplify the internal debate within Chavismo 
during the past decade to identify the grass roots with a softer line and the 
movement’s elites with a political hard line. However, the general point 
that there has been an effort to improve participation through bottom-up 
social mobilization and inclusion, particularly among the traditionally 
disenfranchised in Venezuela, is well taken. Although Ellner emphasizes 
this less, there is also a clear authoritarian bent in key sectors of Chavismo, 
and those sectors are willing to defend some very undemocratic practices 
(even in the area of elections) in their effort to retain power.9
Despite his focus on socioeconomic factors, Ellner does less well in in-
corporating recent debates about the impact of oil rents on government 
performance and the alleviation of poverty. Chávez has been fortunate 
in that, since 2003, Venezuela has experienced one of its great oil booms. 
This has allowed the state to paper over most problems with money. It 
is still under debate whether the various social programs created by 
President Chávez have worked, and it is very much in doubt whether they 
are sustainable in the absence of oil-fueled state largesse.10 However, it 
is clear that Venezuela’s success in alleviating poverty and reducing in-
equality has mostly occurred during oil booms, regardless of the orienta-
tion of the government in power.11 Conversely, that the drying up of oil 
rents fuels political crises is well supported by evidence, but this does not 
play a very signifi cant role in Ellner’s analyses of such crises outside of 
his discussion of Carlos Andrés Pérez’s second government, which began 
in 1989.
9. See Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petrostates (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1997).
P5331.indb   246 10/2/10   11:21:13 AM
THE TRANSFORMATION OF VENEZUELA 247
By not addressing the less democratic elements of Chavismo and the 
continuing ineffi cacy and ineffi ciency of government programs, Ellner 
avoids taking his argument to its logical conclusion. It is true that the fre-
quently venomous debate in the media and society as to how authoritarian 
President Chávez is, and as to how effective government programs have 
been during his administration, make diffi cult a sensible study of the sub-
ject. However, there is a strange disconnect in Ellner’s work between the 
ideological underpinnings of Chavismo, on the one hand, and how the 
country really functions, on the other hand. After a decade spent observ-
ing Chavismo, it is not clear to me that concepts such as participatory de-
mocracy and twenty-fi rst-century socialism explain very much about how 
decisions are made in Venezuela. Ellner’s book could have pushed further 
by delineating those areas in which ideological debate actually matters for 
outcomes and those areas where traditional power politics trumps all.
CONCLUSION
Each of the books reviewed here examines an important but under-
studied piece of Venezuela’s recent history. Each in its own way also con-
tributes to the well-established critique of Venezuelan exceptionalism in 
academic studies.12 McBeth’s close study of Gómez’s rule (1908–1935) helps 
us understand the process that transformed Venezuela from a vulnerable 
country with chaotic domestic politics into a modernizing state, integrated 
into the world economy through its role in international energy markets. 
Tinker Salas’s well-researched book helps us understand the role that oil 
played in shaping class, race, and gender relations in the twentieth century, 
particularly in the oil industry. Ellner provides a thorough review of the 
evolution of Venezuelan politics to the present day, together with a serious 
examination of the state of play in ideological debates within Chavismo.
Although the books are all well worth reading, they are not without 
fl aws. McBeth’s volume is written for specialists in Venezuelan history and 
would benefi t from a more thorough introduction. Without an overview of 
the historical context that Gómez faced when he came to power, it is easy 
to miss just how important his rule was for state formation in Venezuela. 
Tinker Salas offers excellent fi eldwork and analysis, although some may 
fi nd that his disciplinary jargon occasionally gets in the way of a fascinat-
ing story. He also overreaches somewhat in attempting to connect the oil 
industry’s efforts to shape its employees’ values to the contentious politics 
of Venezuela today, if only because so many other factors also affect the 
formation of the middle class. Finally, Ellner falls short of connecting his 
very nuanced understanding of the ideological debate within Chavismo 
to a sense of how this debate actually infl uences practices, particularly in 
those spheres of politics in which all that truly matters is what President 
Chávez says.
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